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A central goal of industrial organization is to understand the determinants of ¯rm conduct
and market structure. I study competition when consumers value ¯rm scope across markets.
Such competition is surprisingly common. Consumers have preferences for scope across geo-
graphic markets in the commercial banking industry, the cell phone industry, the video rental
industry, the ¯tness club industry, and elsewhere. Consumers also have preferences for scope
across some product markets. For example, consumers prefer to purchase cable television
together with internet service, automobile insurance with homeowners/rental insurance, and
cellular phones with portable music players (e.g., the iPhone). Nonetheless, the e®ect of
these preferences on competition has yet to receive substantial attention from the academic
literature. The primary objective of this paper is to help ¯ll this gap.
I start with a theoretical model of multimarket competition. I consider technologically
identical ¯rms that determine their scope across markets and then compete in prices within
markets. Consumers prefer ¯rms of greater scope but di®er in their willingness-to-pay for
scope. I solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and show that these preferences
have implications for competition both across and within markets. Across markets, the
preferences create opportunities for scope di®erentiation and permit ¯rms of greater and
lesser scope to coexist in equilibrium; the preferences are therefore capable of generating
the distribution of scopes observed in the commercial banking industry, the cellular phone
industry, and elsewhere. Within markets, ¯rms of greater scope have both higher prices and
higher market shares. Firms of lesser scope, meanwhile, occupy a (relatively) unpro¯table
niche position in which they attract more price-sensitive consumers.
I tailor the theoretical model to ¯t the institutional details of deposit competition
among commercial banks. The speci¯c setting engenders little loss of generality { the model
easily accommodates consumer preferences for geographic scope in other industries, as well as
consumer preferences for scope across product markets. Further, the focus on the commercial
banking industry conveys a substantial advantage to the empirical analysis. Due to the
industry's history of regulation, comprehensive panel data exist on bank balance sheets and
income statements, as well as on the geographic location of bank branches and deposits.
In the empirical analysis, I estimate the theoretical model structurally and test the ¯rst-
order assumption on consumer preferences. I then examine a number of distinct empirical
predictions for ¯rm conduct and market structure. Thus, I am able to provide evidence,
for at least one speci¯c setting, that consumers prefer ¯rms of greater scope but di®er in
willingness-to-pay, and that these preferences have real implications for competition within
1and across markets.
I estimate the model structurally using the simulated generalized method of moments.
Estimation exploits nearly 40,000 bank-market-year observations over the period 2001-2006,
as well as individual-level data from 2000 Consumer Population Survey (CPS) March Sup-
plement. The results suggest that the mean depositor values a unit increase in bank scope at
42.90 cents annually, so that the scope of Bank of America (which operates in 207 metropol-
itan markets) is 88.41 dollars more valuable than the scope of a single-market bank. The
number is quite plausible. A typical deposit account earns 33.86 fewer dollars at Bank
of America than at the average single-market bank, yet Bank of America averages higher
market shares. The data also suggest that scope valuations increase in depositor income,
and a statistical test ¯rmly rejects the null hypothesis of no depositor heterogeneity. Con-
sistent with the theoretical model, the elasticity of deposit demand decreases in scope {
single-market banks face a median elasticity of demand that is more than double the median
elasticity faced by banks that operate in more than twenty metropolitan markets.
I then evaluate three empirical predictions of the theoretical model that are not easily
generated under (realistic) alternative assumptions. Each prediction relates the assumption
on depositor preferences to competition through the same mechanism { if depositors prefer
banks of greater scope but di®er in their willingness-to-pay then banks should di®erentiate
in scope. The predictions are as follows: First, banks should be less likely to enter an
outside market if the original market already features banks of greater scope. Second, banks
should be less likely to enter a speci¯c outside market (conditional on entry to some outside
market) if other banks of similar scope already exist in both the original market and the
speci¯c outside market. Third, the number of banks within a given geographic market
should increase with that market's nearness to other markets. The ¯nal prediction follows
the theoretical result that the number of banks within a market is limited by the number of
relevant outside markets. I test these predictions using standard reduced-form econometric
techniques. Evaluated together, the results suggest that depositor preferences for bank scope
a®ect ¯rm conduct and market structure in the commercial banking industry { and therefore
that the theoretical model is empirically relevant, at least in one speci¯c setting.
To my knowledge, this paper is the ¯rst to formally model competition when consumers
value ¯rm scope. Nonetheless, the paper relates to existing work in at least three other areas.
First, the theoretical model extends the substantial literature on the boundaries of the
¯rm. The assumption on consumer preferences limits ¯rms both across and within markets.
Across markets, the scopes of some ¯rms are limited because expansion would intensify
price competition with competitors of greater scope. Within markets, ¯rm market shares
2are bounded above because revenue gains from monopolization are outweighed by revenue
losses on inframarginal consumers. Of course, the mechanism by which the theoretical model
bounds ¯rm size di®ers from the standard supply-side mechanisms predominately featured in
the literature (e.g., transaction costs in Williamson [1965, 1979, 1985] and Klein, Crawford
and Alchian [1978], and control rights in Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart and Moore [1990]
and Hart [1995]). The assumption on depositor preferences is more closely related to the
vertical di®erentiation models of Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983).
Second, the paper o®ers a new explanation for the stylized fact that commercial banks
di®er greatly in their scope. The di®erences are di±cult to understate: for example, the Bank
of America (which operates in more than 200 metropolitan markets) competes with more
the 3,000 single-market commercial banks. In the extant literature, the most prominent
explanation for this diversity invokes technological factors, in particular the notion that
small banks have comparative advantages evaluating \opaque" small business loans but
comparative disadvantages evaluating other loans (e.g., Stein 2002; Cole, Goldberg and
White 2004; Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein 2005). The argument that depositor
heterogeneity is an important determinant of the scope distribution is compatible with this
and other alternative explanations, in the sense that the results presented here to not rule
out other determinants of bank scope. I leave exploration of the relative importance of these
determinants to future research.
Third, the paper relates to a growing empirical literature on competition among de-
pository institutions. Although a full review of this literature is beyond the scope of this
paper, the work of Adams, Brevoort and Kiser (2007) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) is of
particular relevance.1 These authors estimate structural models that distinguish between
single-market and multimarket commercial banks and show that competition within parti-
tions is more pronounced than competition between partitions. Cohen and Mazzeo argue
informally that the results are due to product di®erentiation across partitions. The theoret-
ical model developed here formalizes and generalizes their argument. Of course, depository
institutions may be of substantive general interest because they are ubiquitous (e.g., nearly
90 percent of U.S. households maintain a checking account [Bucks, Kennickell and Moore
2006]) and important for monetary policy transmission (e.g., Kashyap and Stein 2000).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses two stylized facts of the commercial
banking industry that are consistent with the theoretical model, namely that a bank scope
1Other recent empirical work on the relationship between bank scope and deposit rate competition in-
cludes Beihl (2002), Hannan and Prager (2004), Park and Pennacchi (2004), Berger, Dick, Goldberg and
White (2007), and Dick (forthcoming).
3distribution exists and that banks of greater scope o®er lower deposit rates (i.e., higher
prices) yet capture higher deposit market shares within markets. Section 3 develops the
theoretical model and derives empirical predictions. Section 4 describes the data, estimates
the theoretical model structurally, and tests a number of distinct empirical predictions using
standard reduced-form techniques. Section 5 concludes.
2 Two Stylized Facts
The theoretical model conforms to two stylized facts of the commercial banking industry: 1)
a distribution of bank scope exists and 2) banks of greater scope o®er lower deposit rates yet
capture greater deposit market shares within markets. I develop these facts here and discuss
the relevant literature. I defer detailed discussion of the data for expositional convenience.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the total number of commercial banks with branches in at
least one metropolitan Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) and Panel B shows the mean
number of commercial banks per CBSA.2 Each panel is tabulated by bank scope over the
period 2001-2006. Most banks operate within a single CBSA (e.g., nearly 80 percent in
2006) and the vast majority operate in fewer than six CBSAs (e.g., 97 percent in 2006).
The diversity of bank scope is pronounced within individual CBSAs { nearly 75 percent
of the CBSA-year combinations over the sample period include at least one bank in each
scope category, and the average CBSA-year combination features 11.21, 5.20, 2.22, and 3.80
banks that operate in 1, 2-5, 5-20 and more than 20 CBSAs, respectively. The distribution
is relatively stable through the sample period. Although banks of greater scope are more
common in 2006 than 2001, the changes appear to be of only second-order magnitude. It
may therefore be reasonable to conjecture that bank scope diversity is real and not simply
part of an out-of-equilibrium transition.3
[Table 1 about here.]
The extant literature explains the coexistence of large and small banks as a product
of comparative advantages in loan underwriting technologies. In particular, larger banks
2The O±ce of Management and Budget de¯nes a metropolitan CBSA to be a geographic areas that
contains at least one urban area of 50,000 or more inhabitants. A CBSA also includes surrounding counties
that meet speci¯c commuting requirements.
3Deregulation and technological advances increased the e±cient scope of banking activity during the 1980s
and 1990s. The result was a protracted period of consolidation: for example, Berger (2003) reports that the
number of banks, inclusive of rural banks, decreased from 14,392 to 8,016 over the period 1984-2001. Berger,
Kashyap and Scalise (1995) and Berger (2003) provide excellent reviews of the relevant banking literature.
4may exploit economies to scale in processing easily quanti¯able information (i.e., \hard
information"). By contrast, smaller banks may better handle qualitative information that
is di±cult to transmit and/or verify across layers of bureaucracy (i.e., \soft information"),
because they can properly align loan o±cer research incentives (Stein 2002) and/or mitigate
agency problems (Berger and Udell 2002). Some empirical evidence supports this hypothesis.
Smaller banks typically allocate a far greater proportion of their assets to small business
loans, which may be more di±cult to evaluate via hard information (e.g., Berger, Kashyap,
and Scalise 1995). More directly, the quantitative ¯nancial statements of loan applicants are
less predictive of subsequent underwriting decisions at smaller banks (Cole, Goldberg and
White 2004), and smaller banks also tend to have closer, more personal, more exclusive, and
longer relationships with their borrowers (Berger et al. 2005).4
The extent to which comparative advantages in loan underwriting technologies fully
explain the bank scope distribution is not clear. From a theoretical standpoint, the frame-
work predicts a bimodal scope distribution characterized by distinctly large and small banks
that specialize in the analysis of hard and soft information, respectively. The observed dis-
tribution, by contrast, suggests a prominent role for \medium-sized" banks. Further, recent
empirical evidence suggests that only 20 percent of small business loans issued by banks with
assets under $1 billion are evaluated with soft information underwriting technologies (Berger
and Black 2007). The market for soft information loans, by itself, may not be su±cient to
support the operation of small banks.
I now turn to the second stylized fact. Table 2 shows mean deposit interest rates and
market shares, tabulated by bank scope. The means are based on 45,785 bank-CBSA-year
observations over the period 2001-2006. I calculate the deposit interest rates as interest
expenses over total deposits, and the market shares as a proportion of all commercial bank
deposits in the CBSA-year. As shown, deposit rates decrease with scope and market shares
increase in scope. The di®erences are dramatic: for example, the average single-market bank
o®ers a deposit rate that is 58 percent higher than the average bank with branches in more
than twenty CBSAs, yet it captures less than one-¯fth the market share.
[Table 2 about here.]
One common explanation for the negative relationship between deposit rates and bank
scope is that larger banks have superior access to wholesale funds and substitute away from
deposits (e.g., Kiser 2004; Hannan and Prager 2004; Park and Pennacchi 2004). However,
4Similarly, Liberti and Mian (2006) show that the underwriting decisions of loan o±cers may weight soft
information more heavily than those of bank managers.
5the wholesale funds hypothesis predicts that deposit shares decrease with scope, and is
therefore incomplete at best. Potentially closer is the observation of Bassett and Brady
(2003) that the deposit growth of small banks exceeded that of large banks over the period
1990-2001. Indeed, the combination of sticky deposit supply { due to switching costs and/or
other factors { and appropriate initial conditions could generate the patterns shown in Table
2. Although there is some empirical evidence supporting the existence of deposit supply
stickiness (e.g., Sharpe 1997; Kiser 2002a, 2002b), to my knowledge no work has attempted
to quantify its importance for the banking industry structurally.
3 Theoretical Model
3.1 The equilibrium concept
The theoretical model is based on a three stage non-cooperative game. The timing of the
game is as follows: In the ¯rst stage, banks decide whether to enter a single geographic
market, which I label the inside market. Entry decisions become common knowledge at the
end of the ¯rst stage. In the second stage, banks that enter the inside market choose whether
to establish a presence in each of M outside markets. Finally, banks set deposit rates given
the second stage actions and compete for deposits within the inside market.
Strategies consist of actions to be taken in each of the three stages. Strategies are
therefore of the form: do not enter the inside market; or enter the inside market, establish
a presence in 0;1;:::; or M outside markets (conditional on the ¯rst stage actions), and set
a deposit interest rate (conditional on the ¯rst and second stage actions).
Banks that enter the inside market receive payo®s (pro¯ts) based on a depositor choice
model introduced below. Banks that do not enter the inside market receive payo®s of zero.
The solution concept is that of subgame perfect equilibrium (e.g., Selton 1975). An
n-tuple of strategies forms a subgame perfect equilibrium if it forms a Nash equilibrium in
every stage-game. To solve the game, I ¯rst analyze deposit rate competition in the third
stage, and then turn to the second and ¯rst stages.
3.2 Deposit rate competition
Suppose that j = 1;2;:::;J banks enter the inside market. Each bank is characterized by











where rL is the ¯xed interest rate obtained from investments in a competitive lending market,
N is the size of the inside market, sj is the share of deposits obtained from the inside market,
and rD
: and m: are vectors of the deposit rates and bank scopes, respectively. Without loss
of generality, I normalize the size of the inside market to one.
Deposit shares are determined by a continuum of depositors that di®er only in the
probability with which they travel to outside markets. This probability of travel, which I
denote as ®, is distributed according to some cumulative distribution function F(®) with
support between zero and one. Depositors split the probability of travel evenly across the
outside markets, so that the probability of travel to each outside market is simply ®=M.5
Depositors that travel to an outside market from which their bank is absent pay a cost °
to participate in a competitive ATM market. Thus, the expected utility that depositor i
receives from bank j takes the form















j ¡ °); (2)
where the term
mj
M is the conditional probability of travel to an outside market in which bank









The utility representation has the interpretation that depositors that never travel (i.e., ® = 0)
consider only the deposit interest rate. Importantly, all depositors at least weakly prefer
banks of greater scope for a given deposit interest rate. The set-up therefore ¯ts within the
class of vertical di®erentiation models ¯rst analyzed by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) and
Tirole (1988, Section 2.1).6
Depositors select the bank that provides the greatest expected utility. This implic-
itly de¯nes the set of travel probabilities that corresponds to the selection of bank j, and
5Alternatively, it is possible model depositors that di®er in their market-speci¯c travel probabilities. For
example, one New Yorker may be more likely to visit Chicago than Boston while another may be more likely
to visit Boston than Chicago. The results presented here extend naturally.
6Vertical di®erentiation models typically analyze ¯rms that choose their \quality" and then compete
in prices for consumers that di®er in their willingness-to-pay. In these models, the support of consumer
preferences tends to bound the number of pro¯table ¯rms (e.g., Shaked and Sutton 1983, 1984; Motta 1993)
and prices, market shares, and pro¯ts generally increase in quality (e.g., Shaked and Sutton 1982; Choi and
Shin 1992; Donnenfeld and Weber 1992; Wauthy 1996; Lehmann-Grube 1997).
7integrating over the set yields an expression for the market share of bank j:
sj =
Z
[®j uij¸ uik8 k=1;:::; J]
dF(®): (4)
Ranking banks in increasing order of scope, such that m1 < m2 < ¢¢¢ < mJ, there exists a
travel probability ®j such that depositors characterized by ®j are indi®erent between bank
j and bank j ¡ 1 at the relevant deposit rates and sizes, i.e., E[u(®j;j)] = E[u(®j;j ¡ 1)].









Depositors with the travel probability ® < ®j strictly prefer bank j ¡ 1 to bank j, whereas
depositors with ® > ®j strictly prefer bank j to bank j¡1. The indi®erence travel probability
for the bank of least scope has the special form ®1 =
rD
1
°(1¡m1=M); which re°ects the possibility
that not all depositors select a bank.
Further progress requires an evaluation of the market shares, and I let ® have uniform
density in order to facilitate an analytic solution. The uniform density simpli¯es the market
share equations: sj = ®j+1 ¡ ®j for 0 · j < J and sJ = 1 ¡ ®J.7 One can then di®erentiate


























































A number of results follow. The ¯rst is that the existence of two banks with identical scope
necessarily triggers undi®erentiated Bertrand competition in the deposit interest rate:
Lemma 1. Let two banks of equal scope exist (mj = mk). In any stage game
Nash equilibrium (if it exists), these banks set their deposit rates to the competitive
loan interest rate (rD
j = rD
k = rL). Any bank l with ml · mj = mk does not earn
7The use of the uniform distribution in models of vertically di®erentiated ¯rms is not typically critical to
the results (e.g., Gabszewicz et al. 1981).
8positive pro¯ts.
It follows that banks can earn positive pro¯ts only through scope di®erentiation. The result
places a natural upward bound on the number of banks that can earn positive pro¯ts. The
bound is determined by the extent to which di®erentiation is feasible:
Corollary 1. In any stage game Nash equilibrium (if it exists), no more than
M + 1 banks earn positive pro¯ts.
The logic is intuitive. If more than M + 1 banks exist then at least two banks must be of
equal scope and Lemma 1 applies.
The next results develop the equilibrium relationships between scope, deposit rates,
and market shares. It is apparent from the expected utility speci¯ed in Equation 3 that
depositors at least weakly prefer banks of greater scope at any given deposit interest rate:
Lemma 2. Let bank j have greater scope than bank k (mj > mk). If bank j sets
a deposit rate at least as large as bank k (rD
j ¸ rD
k ) then bank k has zero market
share and does not earn positive pro¯ts.
Lemma 2 helps deliver the key result that deposit interest rates decrease in scope and market
shares increase in scope.
Proposition 1. Any stage game Nash equilibrium (if it exists) features deposit
rates that decrease strictly in scope, i.e., rD
j > rD
j+1 for any j < J. Further, if
J = M + 1 and mj = mj+1 ¡ 1 then any stage game Nash equilibrium features
market shares and pro¯ts that increase strictly in scope, i.e., sj < sj+1, and
¼j < ¼j+1 for any j < J.
Proposition 1 shows that any stage game Nash equilibria (and thus any subgame perfect
equilibrium) must be consistent with the second stylized fact developed in Section 2. Inter-
estingly, the proposition also reconciles the empirical ¯nding of Berger and Mester (2003)
that bank mergers enhance pro¯t productivity but not cost productivity, controlling for mar-
ket power. Under Proposition 1, increases in scope may increase pro¯t even with no changes
in production technology.
Corollary 2. Any stage game Nash equilibrium features deposit rate elasticities
that decrease strictly in scope.
9Corollary 2 establishes that banks of greater scope have less elastic demand. The result
is intuitive because these banks attract depositors with higher probabilities of travel; these
depositors are less sensitive to changes in the deposit interest rate.
The ¯nal stage game result is that a unique stage game Nash equilibrium does indeed
exist, provided the number of banks does not exceed the upward bound for pro¯tability and
the banks are suitably di®erentiated in scope.
Lemma 3. Suppose that J · M +1 and mj 6= mk for all j 6= k. Then a unique
stage game Nash equilibrium exists in which all J banks have positive pro¯ts.
3.3 Entry and competition in bank scope
I now analyze competition in the second and ¯rst stages, in turn.
In the second stage, banks that enter the inside market choose their scope, given
the number of inside market entrants (J) and the number of outside markets (M). The
characterization of the subgame perfect strategies in the two stage subgame depends on the
relative number of entrants and outside markets. In particular, I develop separate results
for the cases in which J · M + 1 and J > M + 1:
Lemma 4. If J · M + 1 then the two stage subgame has a unique class of
subgame perfect equilibria in which each bank di®ers in scope.
Lemma 5. If J > M + 1 then the two stage subgame has a unique class of
subgame perfect equilibria in which mj = mk for some j and k and there is at
least one bank of each scope over mj+1; mj+2; :::;M.
The results follow naturally from the third stage deposit rate competition. So long as the
number of entrants is no greater than the upward bound established in Corollary 1, any
bank that is not di®erentiated in scope has a pro¯table deviation in the second stage. On
the other hand, if the number of entrants exceeds the upward bound then at least one bank
is undi®erentiated and earns no pro¯ts in the third stage, yet has no pro¯table deviation in
the second stage.
To complete the analysis, in the ¯rst stage some number of banks choose whether to
enter the inside market given the number of outside markets (M) and with full knowledge of
competition in the subsequent stages. In order to eliminate equilibria in which banks enter
and then fail to earn positive pro¯ts in the third stage, I introduce an arbitrarily small entry
cost ² > 0. The main result of the theoretical model follows immediately.
10Proposition 2. For any su±ciently small ² > 0 and any number of potential
entrants N > M, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which
exactly M+1 banks enter the inside market. Each bank enters a di®erent number
of outside markets and earns positive pro¯ts.
Proposition 2 establishes that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is consistent the ¯rst
stylized fact presented in Section 2, namely that a diversity of bank scopes exists. This
diversity exists despite the fact that every depositor at least weakly prefers banks of greater
scope for a given interest rate. The presence of depositor heterogeneity allows larger banks
to reduce their deposit rates and still attract depositors with high scope valuations. Smaller
banks, meanwhile, maintain a (relatively) unpro¯table niche position in which they attract
depositors with low scope valuations.8
3.4 Testable empirical predictions
To the extent that di®erences in depositor willingness-to-pay exist and are important, the
theoretical model has a number of empirical predictions:
Prediction 1. A diversity of bank scopes should exist within markets.
Prediction 2a. Banks of greater scope should have lower deposit interest rates
and higher market shares.
Prediction 2b. Banks of greater scope should have less elastic demand.
Section 2 shows that Predictions 1 and 2a hold in the banking data over the period 2001-
2006, and results from the structural model (Section 4.2) are consistent with Prediction
2b. Although a number of alternative theories can together generate these predictions, the
theoretic model presented here may retain its appeal because it provides a single intuitive
explanation. The next predictions further di®erentiate the theoretical model:
Prediction 3. A bank in market a should be less likely to enter an outside
market if banks of greater scope are already in market a.
8The result that some smaller ¯rms may prefer their niche position has empirical parallels. For example,
Bajari, Fox and Ryan (2006) note that small cellular carriers often do not agree to charge roamers low
per-minute rates.
11Prediction 4. Conditional on entry to some outside market, a bank in market
a should be less likely to enter market b if another bank of similar scope already
exists in markets a and b.
Prediction 5. The number of banks within a market should increase with the
market's nearness to other markets.
The third and fourth predictions follow the theoretical result that scope di®erentiation im-
proves pro¯tability (e.g., Lemmas 1 and 4). The ¯fth prediction follows the intuition that
depositors are more likely travel to nearby markets than distant ones. Markets that are near
others have more relevant outside markets, and thus o®er superior opportunities for scope
di®erentiation (e.g., Corollary 1). I use standard reduced-form econometric techniques to
evaluate these predictions in Section 4.3.
4 Data and Empirical Implementation
4.1 Data
The bulk of the data used in this study comes from the Summary of Deposits and the
December and June Call Reports. The Summary of Deposits tracks the location of all
commercial bank branches and deposits and is maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). The Call Reports contain the balance sheets and income statements
of commercial banks and are maintained by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC). I compile data from these sources over the period 2001-2006. The data
yield 26,905 observations on the bank-year level and 45,785 observations on the bank-CBSA-
year level; each observation is in June of its respective year.
Table 3 presents summary statistics at the bank-year and bank-CBSA-year level. The
main quantities of interest are the deposit interest rates, the market shares, and the bank
scopes. I calculate the deposit rates as interest expenses (incurred over the previous year)
over deposits (averaged over the previous year), the market shares as deposits over the sum
of all commercial bank, thrift, and credit union deposits, and the scopes as the numbers
of CBSAs in which the banks have branches. To be clear, the deposit interest rates and
the scopes vary on the bank-year level, and the market shares vary on the bank-CBSA-year
level.9 The mean bank-year observation has a deposit rate of 0.019, an average market share
of 0.025, and scope of 1.70. The means of the bank-year-CBSA observations more heavily
9The lack of CBSA-speci¯c deposit rates may not hinder empirical analysis. More than 80 percent of
12weight banks that operate in many CBSAs. The lower deposit rate mean (0.017) and higher
market share mean (0.047) are consistent with the stylized fact that banks of greater scope
o®er lower deposit rates and have higher market shares.
Turning to the remaining commercial bank variables, the mean bank-year observation
has 1.235 billion dollars in gross total assets. The assets are funded, in part, by an average
of 0.76 billion dollars in deposits and invested in an average of 0.72 billion dollars worth
of loans. Finally, the mean bank-year observation has 2.94 branches in each of its markets,
employs 23.41 people per branch, and charged o® roughly ¯ve million dollars of loans over the
previous year. The mean bank-CBSA-year observation has much higher gross total assets,
loans, deposits, and branch density because the mean more heavily weights the larger banks.
[Table 3 about here.]
The statistical tests of the empirical predictions require some aggregation to the CBSA-
year level, and Table 4 presents summary statistics for the 2,160 CBSA-year observations in
the data over the period 2001-2006. As shown, the mean CBSA-year contains 9.49 billion
dollars in deposits, spread among 21.02 banks and 152.11 bank branches. The mean CBSA
population, median household income (in dollars), and land area are 645.47, 48.03, and 22.11
thousand, respectively. Implicit in the data construction is the notion that metropolitan
CBSAs approximate well the relevant geographic markets for depository services. Recent
research provides some support: Amel and Starr-McCluer (2001) show that the median
household travels only three miles to its depository institution and that roughly 90 percent
of checking and savings accounts are held by local depository institutions. Kwast, Starr-
McCluer and Wolken (1997) report similar numbers for small businesses. Finally, Heit¯eld
(1999) and Heit¯eld and Prager (2004) show that average deposit rates vary across cities,
and interpret the results as consistent with local market competition.
[Table 4 about here.]
4.2 The estimation of depositor willingness-to-pay
In this section, I develop and estimate a structural model of depositor choice and test the ¯rst-
order assumption of the theoretical model, namely that depositors prefer banks of greater
the bank-year observations have branches in a single CBSA, and larger banks tend to set uniform deposit
rates across CBSAs (e.g., Radecki 1998; Heit¯eld 1999). Although the regulatory reports do not report the
location of ATMs, Dick (forthcoming) reports a correlation coe±cient between the number of branches and
the number of ATMs of 0.80, based on data obtained from a large ATM network.
13scope but di®er in their willingness-to-pay.10 To improve the empirical relevancy of the
theoretical model, I augment the expected utility speci¯cation of Equation 3 such that it














X + »jmt + ²ijmt; (7)
where i, j, m, and t index depositors, banks, markets, and years, respectively. The vector
xjmt includes observable bank characteristics, the scalar »jmt is the mean depositor valuation
of bank j, and the scalar ²ijmt allows for depositor-speci¯c taste shocks. Within the context
of the theoretical model, the parameter ¯D
i is the inverse travel probability (i.e., ¯D
i = 1=®)
and the parameter ¯M is the annualized cost of participating in the competitive ATM market
(i.e., ¯M = °.) I combine these parameters to calculate willingness-to-pay for a unit increase
in scope, given by ¯M=(M¯D
i ).11 The ¯nal parameter vector, ¯X, captures the contribution
of bank observables to expected utility.
The depositor-speci¯c parameter ¯D
i allows for heterogeneity in the willingness-to-
pay for bank scope. I model the parameter as having the multivariate normal distribution




D + ¼yi + ¾ºi; ºi » N(0;1); (8)
where yi is income, ºi captures unobserved demographics, the parameter ¯D is the mean
depositor interest rate valuation, the parameter ¼ allows this mean valuation to vary across
incomes, and ¾ is a scaling vector. This formulation permits a simple statistical test for the
presence of heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay: under the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity,
the demographic parameters ¼ and ¾ are jointly zero.
As in the theoretical model, I permit depositors to select the outside option, i.e., elect
not to choose a commercial bank. I let the outside option be thrifts and credit unions, and
use thrift and credit union balance sheets to determine the outside option market shares
directly.12 The use of alternative outside option shares, calculated as population (times a
10The structural model requires its own set of assumptions, and I evaluate throughout the extent to which
estimation is robust to di®erent speci¯cations and identi¯cation strategies.
11I convert willingness-to-pay into dollar terms by multiplying by 3,800, the median dollar amount held
in transaction accounts (Bucks, Kennickell and Moore 2006).
12The use of thrifts and credit unions as the outside good is somewhat compelling. Amel and Starr-
McCluer (2001) show that commercial banks, thrifts and credit unions together account for 98 percent of all
checking and savings accounts. Further, lumping the individual thrift and credit union institutions together
may not unduly restrict the substitution patterns of interest: Adams, Brevoort and Kiser (2007) estimate a
median cross interest rate elasticity between commercial banks and thrifts and only -0.002.
14constant of proportionality) less commercial bank deposits, returns similar parameter esti-
mates. I denote the outside option as j = 0. Since the mean valuations of the outside option
are not separably identi¯able, I let the expected utility obtainable from the outside option
be E[ui0mt] = ²i0mt:
I again maintain the assumption that depositors select the bank that provides the
greatest expected utility. This de¯nes the set of depositor attributes fyim, ºim, ²i:mtg that
correspond to the selection of bank j in market m and year t. Integrating over the set yields
an expression for the deposit market shares:
sjmt =
Z
[(yi; ºi; ²ijmt)j uijmt> uikmt8 k=0;:::; J]
dF(²)dF(º)dF(y); (9)
where F(¢) denotes the relevant population distribution functions. Speci¯c distributional
assumptions on F(¢) enable evaluation of the integral via analytic and/or numerical meth-
ods. Throughout, I let ²ijmt be distributed iid with the extreme value type I density. The
distributional assumption on ² is itself not restrictive, as mixed logit models can approximate
any random utility model, to any degree of accuracy, given appropriate choices of regressors
and random parameter distributions (McFadden and Train 2000).13
As a prelude to the mixed logit estimation, I ¯rst impose the restriction that depositors
have homogenous tastes for observables (i.e., I impose ¼ = ¾ = 0). The restriction makes
integration over the demographics y and º unnecessary. The resulting logit demand system
follows from analytical integration over the depositor-speci¯c taste shocks:












X + »jmt: (10)
The equation can be estimated by treating the mean valuation (»jmt) as an unobserved error
term. The logit demand system is problematic because it speci¯es unrealistic elasticities
(e.g., Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001) and does not permit the
test of depositor heterogeneity that is of interest here. Nonetheless, its estimation is much
less computationally burdensome than that of the mixed logit model, and may also provide
substantial intuition regarding the validity of the identi¯cation strategy.14
Table 5 shows the logit results. The Column 1 results are computed with OLS. The
13Somewhat more troublesome, given the empirical evidence regarding depositor switching costs (e.g.,
Sharpe 1997; Kiser 2002a, 2002b), is the assumption that the taste shocks are independent over time.
14The mixed logit estimation requires demographic information from the Consumer Population Survey
(CPS). The information is available for a subset of the CBSAs in the full sample. For consistency, I use the
subset to estimate the logit model. The results are robust to the use of the full sample.
15coe±cients have the expected signs: depositors appear to prefer to prefer banks with higher
deposit rates, greater scopes and branch densities, and more employees per branch. The
deposit rate coe±cient of 12.78 corresponds to a median deposit rate elasticity of only 0.18.
One might expect these numbers to understate the true depositor responsiveness to deposit
interest rate changes. If higher quality banks (i.e., those with high mean valuations) tend
to o®er lower deposit rates, then the assumed orthogonality between the deposit rates and
mean valuations fails and the estimated coe±cient should be too small.15
[Table 5 about here.]
I employ two sets of instruments to help mitigate this potential endogeneity problem.
The ¯rst set relies on the notion that loan-side conditions may a®ect deposit pricing (e.g.,
Kiser 2004) but have no direct e®ect on depositor valuations. In particular, I proxy the








Banks with higher loans-to-assets ratios may be more likely seek additional deposits with
which to fund loans, and banks with higher charge-o®s may have greater lending costs and less
incentive to attract additional deposits. Turning to the second set of instruments, under the
maintained assumption that the non-deposit rate characteristics are exogenous, competitor
non-price characteristics provide natural instruments. Similarly to Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995), I calculate the sum of competitor characteristics and then average this sum
















and xjmt, Mjt is the set of
markets in which bank j has branches, and Jmt is the set of banks with branches in market
m. In Table 5, I refer to the two sets of instruments as \Loans" and \CC," respectively.16
15Adams, Brevoort and Kiser (2007), Knittel and Stango (2007), and Dick (forthcoming), estimate median
interest rate elasticities for the commercial banking industry of 2.31, 1.20, 1.70 respectively. Elasticities below
one in magnitude are often considered inconsistent with pro¯t maximization.
16The model does not provide intuition regarding the form of the relationship (if any) between the deposit
interest rate and the instruments. I use third-order polynomials in each instrument to °exibility estimate
the ¯rst stage.
16I show the baseline 2SLS logit results in Column 2. As expected, the estimated deposit
rate coe±cient of 105.06 is much larger, and the implied median deposit rate elasticity is
a more plausible 1.47. A statistical comparison to the OLS results, ala Hausman (1978),
easily rejects the null that the deposit rate is exogenous to depositor mean valuations. The
bank scope coe±cient of 4.35 remains statistically di®erent than zero and is consistent with
depositors that prefer banks of greater scope. The coe±cients imply an annual willingness-
to-pay for a unit increase in bank scope of 43.70 cents. The number may be substantial.
For example, it implies that depositors value the scope of Bank of America (branches in 207
CBSAs in 2006) at roughly 89.97 dollars more than that of a single-market bank. By way
of comparison, the 2006 data suggest that the median account of 3,800 dollars earns 33.86
fewer dollars at Bank of America than at the average single-market bank.17
The consistency of the logit estimation depends on 1) the validity of the instruments
and 2) the exogeneity of the non-deposit rate characteristics. I examine these assumptions
in the remaining columns. To start, Column 3 estimates the model using only the loan-side
instruments. The results are quite similar to the baseline. If one is willing to assume that the
loan-side instruments are valid, then a comparison to the baseline results yields a statistical
test for the validity of the competitor characteristic instruments (e.g., Hausman 1978; Ruud
2000). Intuitively, the Column 3 estimates are consistent given the exogeneity of the loan-side
instruments. Under the null hypothesis that the competitor characteristics are also valid,
the baseline coe±cients should be similar. The data do not reject the null (p-value= 0:983).
Column 4 estimates the model using only the competitor characteristic instruments. The
results are again similar to the baseline, and the data fail to reject the null that the loan-
side instruments are valid, given the validity of the competitor characteristic characteristics
(p-value= 0:764). Together, the results provide some evidence that the instruments may be
valid.
Columns 5 and 6 help evaluate the exogeneity of bank scope. One might expect the
baseline estimated scope coe±cient to overstate the true e®ect. If higher quality banks (i.e.,
banks for which depositors have higher mean valuations) tend to enter more markets, then
the assumed orthogonality between scope and the mean valuations fails and the estimated co-
e±cient should be too large. To help address this concern, I decompose the mean valuations
17The results are robust to a number of alternative speci¯cations. For example, the inclusion of market
or year ¯xed e®ects (which limits identi¯cation derived from outside good market shares), the inclusion of
the deposit fee rate as an additional endogenous regressor (i.e., fee income over deposits), and the use of the
alternative outside good (calculated as population times a constant of proportionality less commercial bank
deposits), do not substantially alter the results.
17into bank ¯xed e®ects and market-year speci¯c valuations:
»jmt = »j + ¢»jmt; (13)
and estimate the bank ¯xed e®ects directly.18 The scope coe±cient is then identi¯ed from
changes in scope, i.e. o® of bank entry. For illustration, consider a bank j that operates in
CBSA m during period t and in both CBSAs m and n during period t+1. Two comparisons
identify the scope coe±cient. The ¯rst comparison is that of bank j's market share in CBSA
m across periods. An increase in market share would suggest that scope provides value to
depositors. The second comparison is that of bank j's market share in CBSA m during
period t and bank j's market share in CBSA n during period t + 1. A market share that is
higher in the latter instance would again suggest that depositors value scope. The second
comparison is confounding empirically, however, because bank entrants tend to have small
market shares initially (e.g., Berger and Dick 2007), due to switching costs and/or other
factors.
Column 5 presents the results of the bank ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation. The bank scope
coe±cient of 2.31 is more than 45 percent smaller than the baseline coe±cient and is no
longer statistically di®erent than zero.19 However, it is not clear whether the reduction
is due to the correction of endogeneity bias or due to the confounding market shares of
recent entrants. To address the matter, I add lagged market share to the speci¯cation,
which controls for the out-of-equilibrium e®ects associated with entry. Column 6 presents
the results. The bank scope coe±cient of 4.39 is larger, close to the baseline coe±cient,
and statistically signi¯cant. Together, the Column 5 and 6 results suggest that bank scope
endogeneity may be unimportant in the baseline speci¯cation. More generally, the results
shown in Columns 3 through 6 provide empirical support for the identi¯cation strategy.
I now return to the mixed logit case, in which depositors are permitted to have heteroge-
nous tastes for observables. Estimation requires numerical integration over demographic
characteristics (as in Equation 9). I let income have the lognormal distribution within CB-
SAs and estimate the income distributions using individual-level data from the 2000 CPS
March Supplement. I then draw 200 quasi-random incomes for each CBSA from the appro-
18The procedure yields consistent estimates provided that a bank's quality is ¯xed across markets. In the
implementation, I estimate separate e®ects for the 1,212 banks that have branches in at least two CBSAs at
some point during the sample, and estimate a shared e®ect for the remaining banks. The restriction greatly
eases the computational burden, and the procedure should still mitigate bias due to scope endogeneity. The
parameters of interest are not well-identi¯ed empirically when a separate ¯xed e®ect is estimated for each
single-market bank because the e®ects overtax the data (there are six observations per single-market bank).
19The data reject the null that the bank ¯xed e®ects are jointly zero (p-value= 0:00).
18priate estimated distribution. I proxy the unobserved demographics with 200 quasi-random
draws from a standard normal distribution. To ease interpretation, I normalize income to
have mean zero and variance one across all CBSAs, following Nakamura (2006).20
With the numerical integration in hand, I am able to obtain the vector of mean deposi-
tor valuations, », for any set of proposed parameters µ = (¯D;¯M;¯X;¼;¾) via a contraction
mapping algorithm (e.g., Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995, Nevo 2001). The
parameters are then identi¯ed by the usual assumption, namely that E[Z0»(µ¤)] = 0; where
Z includes the instruments and µ¤ includes the true population parameters. The simulated
generalized method of moments (SGMM) estimator takes the form:






where ©¡1 is a consistent estimate of E[Z0»(µ¤)»(µ¤)0Z]. I compute the standard errors with
the usual formulas (e.g., Hansen 1982; Newey and McFadden 1994), and apply a clustering
correction that allows for the consistent estimation of the standard errors in the presence of
arbitrary correlation patterns between observations from the same bank.21
Table 6 presents the results of the mixed logit regression. The mean depositor valua-
tions (¯'s), shown in the ¯rst column, are similar to those of the baseline logit results. The
mean valuations for the deposit interest rate and bank scope are 115.92 and 4.70, respec-
tively, and the implied mean willingness-to-pay for a unit increase in bank scope is 42.92
cents. Again, this number may be substantial, as it implies that the mean depositor values
the scope of Bank of America (branches in 207 CBSAs in 2006) at roughly 88.41 dollars more
than that of a single-market bank. The results also suggest that depositors may prefer banks
with greater branch densities and more employees per branch, though the ¯rst coe±cient
is smaller in magnitude (vis-a-vis the logit results) and the second is no longer statistically
signi¯cant.
[Table 6 about here.]
The next columns show estimates of depositor heterogeneity around the mean deposit
20CPS data are available for 259 CBSAs. Estimation uses 38,993 of 45,785 bank-CBSA-year observations.
I use Halton numbers to capture income and unobserved demographics. Train (1999) and Bhat (2001) ¯nd
that the simulation variance caused by 100 Halton quasi-random numbers is smaller than the simulation
variance caused by 1,000 random draws. In estimating the CBSA-speci¯c income distributions, I consider
the household income of individuals over 18 years in age. I trim the bottom 1.5 percent of the sample to
eliminate negative and zero incomes, which are incompatible with the lognormal assumption.
21I follow the procedure outlined in Nevo (2000) to perform the contraction mapping. I use a gradient
algorithm supplied by the Mathworks optimization package to select the nonlinear parameters.
19rate valuation. The estimated deposit rate parameter standard deviation (¾) is small and
not statistically signi¯cant. By contrast, the coe±cient on the interaction with depositor
income (¼) is large and statistically di®erent than zero. The coe±cient suggests that a one
standard deviation increase in income lowers the deposit rate valuation by 65.58, so that
higher income depositors are less price-sensitive. A joint statistical test rejects the null of
no heterogeneity (i.e., ¾ = ¼ = 0) at any conventional level. Figure 1 graphs the estimated
willingness-to-pay distribution.22 The skew of the distribution re°ects the result that the
lognormally distributed depositor incomes matter more to deposit rate valuations than the
normally distributed unobserved demographics. The 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the
empirical distribution are 31.30, 35.22, and 44.56 cents, respectively, so that a depositor at
the 75th percentile has a willingness-to-pay that is 42.34 percent greater than a depositor
at the 25th percentile. Overall, the results are strongly consistent with the notion that
depositor heterogeneity exists and is substantial.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The theoretical model predicts that banks of greater scope should have less elastic
deposit demand. Intuitively, these banks attract depositors that value scope more relative
to the deposit interest rate. The median elasticity of demand in the sample is 1.84; consistent
with the theoretical model, demand elasticities decrease substantially with bank scope.23 The
median elasticity faced by banks with branches in 1, 2-5, 6-20, and more than 20 markets is
2.20, 1.95, 1.47, and 1.01, respectively, so that the median elasticity faced by a single-market
bank is more than double that of the largest banks. The results underscores the empirical
relevance of the theoretical model to competition for depositors within metropolitan markets.
4.3 Further tests of the empirical predictions
4.3.1 The decision to enter an outside market
The theoretical model predicts that a bank should be less likely to enter an outside market
if its original markets already feature banks of greater scope. Intuitively, the presence of
22Roughly ¯ve percent of depositors have deposit rate valuations near or below zero. The corresponding
willingness-to-pay for these depositor is quite large (or quite small) and is not shown.













i sijmt(1 ¡ sijmt)dF(º)dF(y);
where the term sijmt represents the depositor-speci¯c probability (based on the logit formulas) of choosing
bank j during period t given the demographic characteristics y and º.
20larger banks creates an environment in which entry would lessen scope di®erentiation and
intensify deposit rate competition. I examine the empirical prediction using data on the
entry decisions of single-market banks. Within this speci¯c context, the empirical prediction
can be precisely formulated. Suppose a single-market bank operates in market a. Then
the single-market bank should be less likely to enter any second market if more two-market
banks already operate in market a.
To test the empirical prediction, I construct a regression sample of single-market banks
over the period 2001-2005. The 14,469 bank-year observations in the sample include 3,658
single-market banks that, combined, operate in 191 CBSAs.24 Of these single-market banks,
351 enter a second market during the sample period. Banks that enter a second market
drop out of the sample after entry. The estimation procedure is standard logit model. Let
j = 1;2;:::;J single-market banks, each based in an original market aj, determine whether
to enter a second market in period t + 1. I represent the latent utility of entry and the







jt¸2 + °at + ´jt and vj;t+1 = 1fv
¤
j;t+1 > 0g; (15)
respectively. The vector NBANKSajt captures the number of banks in market aj during
period t that have branches in exactly one, exactly two, three through ten, and more than
ten CBSAs. I refer to these four variables as NBK1ajt; NBK2ajt, NBK3ajt and NBK4ajt,
respectively. The primary variable of interest is NBK2ajt; the theoretical model implies that
its coe±cient should be negative. The vector wjt includes controls at the bank-year level
and the vector °at includes market and year ¯xed e®ects. The parameter vectors ¸1 and ¸2
can be consistently estimated with standard logit regression under the assumption that the
error term ´jt has the extreme value type I density.25
Before turning to the results, some discussion of the speci¯cation may be fruitful. First,
market ¯xed e®ects solve the basic identi¯cation problem that markets may di®er in their
ability to support banks of greater scope (potentially for unobservable reasons). Such market
24The remaining CBSAs never have a single-market bank enter a second market. I exclude the corre-
sponding 3,744 bank-year observations from the regression sample. The use of market ¯xed e®ects makes
the inclusion/exclusion of these observations irrelevant for estimation because the ¯xed e®ect parameters
perfectly predict observed entry.
25Two econometric points may be of interest. First, the estimation of market and year ¯xed e®ects within
the limited dependent variable framework does not introduce incidental parameters bias because the ratio
of observations to parameters converges to in¯nity with the number of banks per market-year. Overall, I
estimate 201 parameters using 14,469 observations. Second, I cluster the standard errors at the market level
to account for arbitrary correlation patterns among bank-year observations in the same market.
21heterogeneity, if unaccounted for in the regression speci¯cation, would bias the NBK2ajt
coe±cient upwards and against the empirical prediction. The upward bias occurs because
markets that better support banks of greater scope are likely to have more banks of greater
scope; further, single-market banks in these markets may ¯nd entry into an outside market
more pro¯table. The inclusion of market ¯xed e®ects controls directly for this confounding
in°uence. Second, the bank-year control variables include the deposit and branch market
shares of the single-market branch in its original market. One might expect banks that have
more substantial market shares in their original markets to be more likely to enter a second
market.
The ¯rst column of Table 7 presents the baseline results. The NBK2ajt coe±cient is
negative and statistically di®erent than zero, consistent with the theoretical model. The
coe±cient is also substantial in magnitude. For example, a hypothetical one standard devi-
ation increase in NBK2ajt reduces the probability that a single-market bank enters a second
market by an average of 76.54 percent.26 Overall, the regression results strongly support
the prediction that banks should be less likely to enter an outside market if their original
markets already feature banks of greater scope. The results also underscore the empirical
importance of this prediction. Turning quickly to the control variables, single-market banks
that have larger deposit and branch market shares in their original markets are more likely
to enter a second market, though only the branch market share coe±cient is statistically
signi¯cant (results not shown).
Interestingly, the entry choices of single-market banks appear uncorrelated with the
number of banks in the original market that operate in more than two markets. The NBK3ajt
and NBK4ajt coe±cients of 0.034 and -0.069 are small in magnitude and not statistically
di®erent than zero. This empirical result dovetails nicely with the theoretical model, in which
banks compete for market share only with their immediate neighbors in scope-space (e.g.,
Equations 5 and 6). One might infer from the results that competition in the commercial
banking industry is predominately \local" in geographic scope.27
26The mean number of two-market banks in the regression sample is 8.14. The standard deviation is
6.39. To measure the average percent change in entry probabilities, I ¯rst calculate the probability of







; where the vectors xjt and b ¸ include the regressors and estimated coe±cients,
respectively. I then calculate the probability of entry for each observation given a hypothetical increase in the
number of two-markets banks present in the original market. This probability, call it pjt2, has an expression





t=1 (pjt2 ¡ pjt1)=pjt1:
27Recent theoretical and empirical work in industrial organization has examined the extent to which
competition in di®erentiated markets is local versus global (e.g., Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse 1989,
Pinske, Slade and Brett 2002, Vogel 2008), and shown that the distinction is important from a policy
22[Table 7 about here.]
At the risk of digression, Columns 2 through 4 show the results when the market ¯xed
e®ects and/or the bank control variables are excluded from the speci¯cation. As discussed
above, one might expect the estimated NBK2ajt coe±cient to be less negative (or even posi-
tive) when market ¯xed e®ects are excluded, due to the confounding in°uence of unobserved
market heterogeneity. This is precisely what happens. Column 2 omits the market ¯xed
e®ects; the speci¯cation is otherwise identical to that of Column 1. The resulting NBK2ajt
coe±cient is nearly zero. The coe±cients on NBK1ajt, NBK3ajt, and NBK4ajt also change
in the predicted directions. Finally, Column 3 omits only the bank control variables and
Column 4 omits both the market ¯xed e®ects and the bank control variables. In each case,
the exclusion of the bank controls has little e®ect on the estimated regression coe±cients.
One might conclude that bank heterogeneity has little e®ect on the main results.
4.3.2 The choice of which outside market to enter
Any bank that enters an outside market must decide which outside market to enter. The
second empirical prediction deals with this choice between outside markets. In particular,
the theoretical model predicts that a bank with branches in market a should be less likely to
enter market b (conditional on entry somewhere) if another bank of similar scope exists with
branches in both market a and market b. I again turn to the entry decisions of single-market
banks to provide a speci¯c context in which to test the empirical prediction.
To motivate the empirical strategy, consider the following simpli¯ed setting: a single-
market bank (bank j) is based in an original market (aj) and enters one of two outside
markets (b1 or b2). Suppose that a two-market bank already exists with branches in aj and
b1. Then the theoretical model suggests that bank j is more likely to enter b2 because it
o®ers greater scope di®erentiation. One could test the hypothesis by regressing the observed
entry decision on an indicator variable, call it 2CBSAjb, that equals one if a two-market
bank exists in markets aj and b, and 0 otherwise. Provided that the two-market bank is
randomly assigned between b1 and b2, the regression coe±cient provides a consistent test
of the empirical prediction. Of course, this condition is unlikely to hold in practice. The
two-market bank may operate in aj and b1 because b1 is more pro¯table than b2, and/or
because greater synergies exist between aj and b1 than between aj and b2. Both possibilities
threaten to bias the regression coe±cient upwards, i.e., against the empirical prediction, and
I control directly for these potentially confounding factors.
standpoint (e.g., Dineckere and Rothschild 1992).
23The actual empirical model generalizes the simpli¯ed setting to allow for many banks
and many outside markets. Let j = 1;2;:::;J single-market banks, based in the original
markets aj, determine which of b = 1;2;:::;B outside markets to enter. Each single-market
banks enters the outside market that provides the greatest value:
v
¤





jb > vjc 8 c 6= bg; (16)
where the scalar 2CBSAjb equals one if a two-market bank already exists with branches
in markets aj and b, and zero otherwise, the scalar SYNERGYjb represents the synergies
between the markets bj and b, and the vector PROFITSb captures the pro¯tability of market
b. The parameters ¸1, ¸2, and ¸3 can be consistently estimated with conditional logit
regression (e.g., Greene 2003, Section 19.7) under the assumption that the bank-speci¯c
error ´jn has the extreme value type I density.28 The theoretical model implies that ¸1 < 0.
I take the empirical model to the 351 instances in which a single-market bank entered an
additional CBSA over the period 2001-2005. The regression observations are combinations
of single-market banks and outside markets: the 351 single-market banks and 359 outside
CBSAs form 126,009 regression observations. The dependent variable equals one if the single-
market bank entered the outside market, and zero otherwise. The independent variable of
interest, 2CBSAjb is directly observable. I proxy the synergies between the home and outside
markets using the proportion of all banks in the original market that also have branches in
the respective outside market. To proxy the pro¯tability of the outside markets, I include
the number of outside market banks with branches in exactly one, exactly two, three through
ten, and more than ten CBSAs. I also include second-order polynomials in median income,
population, and land area. I lag the synergy and pro¯tability controls to mitigate any
potential endogeneity concerns.
The ¯rst column of Table 8 presents the baseline results. The 2CBSAjb coe±cient is
negative and statistically di®erent than zero, consistent with the empirical prediction of the
theoretical model. The coe±cient is sizable in magnitude and suggests that a single-market
bank is on average 35 percent less likely to enter market b if a two-market bank already
exists in aj and b.29 This may actually understate the true e®ect: to the extent that the
28One advantage of the conditional logit framework is that it implicitly controls for unobservable bank
characteristics. To see this, note that adding a bank ¯xed e®ect to Equation 16 does not a®ect the relative
value of the outside markets.
29To be clear, I calculate the probability that bank j enters each outside market b, alternately toggling
2CBSAjb to be 0 and 1, and holding the remaining regressors constant. The percent change in probability
24control variables imperfectly measure synergies and pro¯ts, the true 2CBSAjb parameter is
likely more negative than the estimated coe±cient. Overall, the regression result strongly
supports the empirical prediction of the theoretical model.
[Table 8 about here.]
Again at the risk of digression, Columns 2 through 4 show the results when the synergy
control and/or the pro¯t controls are excluded from the speci¯cation. As discussed above,
one might expect the estimated 2CBSAjb coe±cient to be less negative (or even positive)
due to omitted variables bias in each of these regressions. That is precisely what happens.
Column 2 omits the controls that proxy the outside market pro¯tability. The resulting
2CBSAjb coe±cient remains negative but is smaller in magnitude (-0.241) and not statisti-
cally di®erent than zero. Column 3 omits the synergy controls, and Column 4 omits both
sets of controls. The resulting 2CBSAjb coe±cient is positive and large in both cases. These
alternative regressions may demonstrate the importance of controlling for market synergies
and other factors when testing or estimating scope e®ects.
4.3.3 Market nearness and the number of banks
Finally, the theoretical model generates the empirical prediction that the number of banks
within a given market should increase with its \nearness" to other markets. To examine the
prediction empirically, I proxy nearness inversely with the mean distance in miles between
a CBSA and all other CBSAs.30 The average CBSA has a mean distance of 1060 miles, and
the sample standard deviation is 349 miles.
The empirical prediction holds in the data. Figure 2 plots the univariate relationship
between CBSA nearness and the number of banks for all 2,160 CBSA-year observations
over the period 2001-2006. The three CBSAs with the greatest mean distance (Honolulu,
Anchorage, and Fairbanks) also have very few banks (e.g., 8, 5, and 5 banks, respectively,
in 2006). The CBSA with the most banks (Chicago-Nashville-Jolie, with 231 banks in
2006) has one of the shortest mean distances. Among all CBSAs, the correlation coe±cient
between the number of banks and mean distance is -0.11. Further, an OLS regression of the
that bank j enters the outside market b due to the presence of a two-market bank in markets aj and b is
Pr(bj j;2CBSAjb = 1) ¡ Pr(bj j;2CBSAjb = 0)
Pr(bj j;2CBSAjb = 0)
:
The probabilities have the familiar logit closed form solutions. I report the average percent change among
the regression observations.
30Formally, the proxy is 1
M
P
n6=m DISTmn, where DISTmn is the miles between CBSA m and CBSA n.
25number of commercial banks per CBSA-year observation on mean distance and second-order
control polynomials in CBSA median household income, population, and land area yields a
mean distance coe±cient of -0.014 that is statistically di®erent than zero at standard levels
(standard error = 0:003).31 The regression coe±cient is also substantial in magnitude: a one
standard deviation increase in mean distance corresponds to a 24 percent reduction in the
number of banks when evaluated at the mean.
[Figure 2 about here.]
More detailed investigation calls into question the extent to which the relationship
between CBSA nearness and the number of banks supports the theoretical model, however.
The empirical prediction is generated by the theoretical model because markets near many
others may o®er greater opportunities for scope di®erentiation. One would naturally expect
the relationship between nearness and the number of banks to be driven by di®erences in
the number of multimarket banks rather than the number of single-market banks because,
by de¯nition, single-market banks do not exploit opportunities for scope di®erentiation. The
opposite holds in the data { the relationship between CBSA nearness and the number of
banks appears to be driven primarily by di®erences in the number of single-market banks.
Figure 3 shows a scatterplot of CBSA nearness and the number of single-market banks
for the 2,160 CBSA-year observations over the period 2001-2006. It is clear that, on average,
CBSAs that are near others support more single-market banks. By way of contrast, Figure
4 shows the scatterplot of CBSA nearness and the number of multimarket banks. No rela-
tionship is apparent. Further, an OLS regression of the number of multimarket banks on
mean distance and second-order control polynomials in median household income, popula-
tion, and land area yields a mean distance coe±cient of -0.00003 that is small in magnitude
and not statistically di®erent than zero (standard error = 0:0007). Thus, while the empirical
prediction of the theoretical model holds in the data { CBSAs near many others do support
more banks { it is not apparent that the prediction holds because CBSAs in close proximity
to many others o®er greater opportunities for scope di®erentiation. It is therefore di±cult
to conclude that the relationship between CBSA nearness and the number of banks provides
substantive support for the theoretical model.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
31I cluster the standard errors at the CBSA level to account for heteroscedasticity and arbitrary correlation
patterns between observations from the same CBSA.
265 Conclusion
I model multimarket competition when consumers value ¯rm scope across markets. I show
that these consumer preferences have implications for ¯rm conduct and market structure,
and provide evidence that these implications are empirically relevant. Although the paper
¯lls a gap in the academic literature, much remains to be done. First, the model makes
strong assumptions to isolate the in°uence of consumer preferences; these assumptions could
be relaxed in future work. For example, one could examine preferences for scope in the
presence of scale economies. Second, although the empirical implementation builds the case
that consumer preferences for scope have real e®ects on competition, it does less to evaluate
the magnitude of these e®ects. The estimation of structural supply-side models may help
¯ll this gap. The work of Ishii (2004) on ATM network supply may represent a ¯rst step
towards a suitable modeling framework. Finally, the theoretical model has implications for
merger review and other policy concerns; future research may explore these implications.
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32A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The ¯rst order conditions for bank j and bank k simplify to rD
j =
(1=2)¤(rL +rD
k ) and rD
k = (1=2)¤(rL +rD
j ), respectively, when mj = mk for any j. Solving
the conditions yields rD
j = rD
k = rL. It follows that ¼j = ¼k = 0. Finally, by Equation 3,
depositors strictly prefer banks j and k to any bank l characterized by ml < mj = mk at
the deposit rate rL, so the market share and pro¯t of bank l are zero. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. By Equation 3, expected utility is increasing in deposit rate and bank
scope. Deposits prefer bank j to bank k, and bank k has zero market share. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. I start with the claim that deposits rate decrease in scope, i.e.,
rD
j > rD
j+1 for any j < J. The ¯rst order conditions for pro¯t maximization imply that
rD






j+1) for 1 < j < J. Equilibrium must therefore be
characterized either by deposit rates that decrease strictly in scope, i.e. rD
1 > rD
2 > ¢¢¢ > RD
J
or by deposit rates that increase strictly in scope, i.e. rD
1 < rD
2 < ¢¢¢ < RD
J . But the latter
cannot characterize equilibrium. For example, if rD
J¡1 < rD
J then bank J ¡1 has zero market
share by Lemma 2 and a su±cient deposit rate increase restores positive market share; such
an action is infeasible only when rD
J = rL, in which case bank J earns zero pro¯ts and prefers
to lower its deposit rate. Thus, it must be true that rD
1 > rD
2 > ¢¢¢ > RD
J in any equilibrium.
I now turn to the claim that market shares and pro¯ts increase in scope, i.e. sj < sj+1
and ¼j < ¼j+1 for any j < J = M + 1 with mj = mj+1 ¡ 1. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose that sj > sj+1. Then, by the de¯nition of market share, ®j+1¡®j > ®j ¡®j¡1; and








































































Rearranging and canceling yields the simple condition rj + rj+2 > rj¡1 + rj+1; which con-
tradicts the ¯nding presented above that rj¡1 > rj and rj+1 > rj+2. The claim that pro¯ts
increase in scope is trivially true from Equation 1, given that deposit rates decrease in scope
and market shares increase in scope. ¤
Proof of Corollary 2. The ¯rst-order condition for pro¯t maximization, based on the
















where the term on the left is the deposit \markup" and the term on the right is the inverse
deposit demand elasticity. By Proposition 1, deposit rates decrease strictly in scope. It
follows that markup increases in scope and that demand elasticities decrease in scope. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3. Since in equilibrium rD
1 > rD
2 > ¢¢¢ > RD








j+1) for 1 < j < J, it must be that ®j+1 > ®j by





J imply that ®2 > 0 and ®J < 1, so banks
1 and J have positive market shares. The condition rD
1 > rD
2 necessarily implies rL > rD
1 , by
Equation 6. Therefore, rL > rD
j and sj > 0 for all j, and there exists at least one stage game
Nash equilibrium in which all banks have positive pro¯ts. Finally, rearranging the ¯rst order
conditions such that Ax = b, where A is a matrix of coe±cients, x is a vector of deposit
rates, and b is a vector of solutions, it is apparent by inspection that A is nonsingular for any
J. Applying Cramer's Rule, the ¯rst order conditions generate a unique stage game Nash
equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Lemma 4. If J = M + 1 then the two stage subgame has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in which each bank di®ers in scope. Suppose that each bank enters a
di®erent number of outside markets. By Lemma 3, the third stage features a unique Nash
equilibrium in which each bank earns positive pro¯ts. If a bank deviates in the second stage
then it has a scope that is equal to that of exactly one other bank and, by Lemma 1, earns
zero pro¯ts in the third stage. The strategy pro¯le in which each bank di®ers in scope is
therefore subgame perfect. Next, suppose that some banks choose to be of equal scope.
These banks earn zero pro¯ts by Lemma 1, but have a pro¯table deviation available in the
second stage. The strategy pro¯le in which each bank di®ers in scope is therefore the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium.
If instead J < M + 1 then the two stage subgame has a unique class of subgame
equilibria in which each bank di®ers in scope. Suppose that each bank enters a di®erent
number of outside markets. By Lemma 3, the third stage features a unique Nash equilibrium
in which each bank earns positive pro¯ts. The class of strategy pro¯les in which each
bank di®ers in scope is therefore subgame perfect. Uniqueness follows the reasoning of the
J = M + 1 case. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5. Because J > M + 1, there must exist at least one bank j such that
mj = mk for some bank k. By Lemma 1, banks j and k, as well as any banks of lesser
scope, earn zero pro¯ts in the third stage Nash equilibrium. If the scope space is covered
over mj+1; mj+2; :::;M then bank j has no pro¯table deviation in the second stage. The
class of equilibria is unique: if the scope space is not covered above mj then bank j has a
pro¯table deviation in which it selects the unoccupied scope in the second stage. ¤
34Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that M + 1 banks enter the inside market. Then, by
Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, these banks subsequently enter di®erent numbers of outside
markets and earn positive pro¯ts in the third stage. The outcome is subgame perfect because
no bank has a pro¯table deviation in any subgame. Next, suppose that J > M + 1 banks
enter the inside market. By Lemma 4, at least one bank must earn zero pro¯ts in third
stage; and, given the entry cost ², this bank prefers not to enter the inside market. Lastly,
if J < M + 1 banks enter the inside market then at least one non-entrant prefers to enter
the inside market. The subgame perfect equilibrium is therefore unique. ¤


















Figure 1: The frequency distribution of the willingness-to-pay for a unit increase in bank scope (based on
Table 6). Willingness-to-pay is measured in cents per year.
































Figure 2: Market nearness and the number of banks. Each point represents a single CBSA-year observation.
The vertical axis is the average distance in miles between the CBSA and all other CBSAs. The horizontal
axis is the number of banks in the CBSA-year.































Number of Banks with Branches 1 CBSA
Figure 3: Market nearness and the number of banks with branches in only one CBSA. Each point represents
a single CBSA-year observation. The vertical axis is the average distance in miles between the CBSA and
all other CBSAs. The horizontal axis is the number of banks in the CBSA-year that have branches only one
CBSA.































Number of Banks with Branches in >1 CBSA
Figure 4: Market nearness and the number of banks with branches in more than one CBSA. Each point
represents a single CBSA-year observation. The vertical axis is the average distance in miles between the
CBSA and all other CBSAs. The horizontal axis is the number of banks in the CBSA-year that have branches
in more than one CBSA.
37Table 1: The Bank Scope Distribution, 2001-2006
Panel A: The total number of banks
# of CBSAs 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 3,806 3,694 3,645 3,558 3,510 3,480
2-5 700 725 758 753 781 831
6-20 74 77 82 89 91 95
¸21 23 26 27 28 24 28
Panel B: The mean number of banks per CBSA
# of CBSAs 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 11.29 11.09 10.98 10.68 10.64 10.71
2-5 4.94 5.07 5.19 5.21 5.45 5.83
6-20 2.41 2.46 2.62 2.72 2.88 2.89
¸21 3.49 3.69 3.82 3.96 3.90 4.22
The data include all commercial banks with branches in at least
one CBSA, over the period 2001-2006.
Table 2: Deposit Rates and Market Shares





The table shows mean deposit rates and market
shares by bank scope. The data include all com-
mercial banks with branches in at least one CBSA
over the period 2001-2006, for a total of 45,785
bank-CBSA-year observations.
38Table 3: Commercial Bank Summary Statistics
Units of Observation: Bank-Year Bank-CBSA-Year
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Deposit pricing and market share
rD
jt Deposit rate 0.019 (0.011) 0.017 (0.011)
sjmt Market share 0.025 (0.053) 0.047 (0.078)
Bank scope




Normalized scope -0.998 (0.014) -0.954 (0.109)
Other bank variables
GTAjt Gross total assets 1.235 (17.017) 38.269 (124.512)
LOANSjt Loans 0.721 (9.217) 22.211 (68.094)
DEPSjt Deposits 0.762 (9.366) 24.197 (78.223)
BRDENjmt Branch density 3.935 (8.190) 7.176 (18.933)
NEMPjt # of employees 23.412 (32.002) 24.404 (29.377)
CHGjt Charge-o®s 0.005 (0.107) 0.152 (0.542)
Summary statistics for 26,905 bank-year observations and 45,785 bank-CBSA-year
observations over the period 2001-2006. Gross total assets, deposits, loans, and
charge-o®s are in billions of 2000 dollars.
Table 4: CBSA Summary Statistics
Units of Observation: CBSA-Year
Variable Description Mean St. Dev.
Number of commercial banks, branches, and deposits
BANKmt Total banks 21.202 (24.156)
BRANCHmt Total branches 152.114 (296.166)
DEPmt Total deposits 9.491 (33.771)
Other CBSA variables
POPm Population 645.468 (1487.606)
INCm Median HH income 48.033 (7.692)
MILm Land area 22.111 (22.545)
Summary statistics for 2,160 CBSA-year observations over the pe-
riod 2001-2006. Total deposits are in billions, and population, me-
dian household income, and land area are in thousands.
39Table 5: Logit Regression Results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deposit interest rate
rD
jt 12.780*** 105.060*** 115.269*** 115.846*** 98.576*** 100.821***





2.455*** 4.347*** 4.557*** 4.568*** 2.313 4.387**
(0.333) (0.572) (0.632) (0.605) (2.091) (2.134)
Control variables
BRDENjmt 1.434*** 1.463*** 1.466*** 1.466*** 1.377*** 1.015***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.060) (0.053)
NEMPjt 0.062* 0.073* 0.074* 0.074* -0.002 -0.040
(0.033) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038)
lag(sjmt) 8.824***
(0.693)
Imputed willingness-to-pay for scope
WTP 2.033 0.437 0.418 0.418 0.248 0.464
R2 0.479 0.286 0.240 0.238 0.437 0.443
1st stage F-test ¢ 226.96*** 71.73*** 318.56*** 214.67*** 287.16***
Instruments ¢ Loans+CC Loans CC Loans+CC Loans+CC
Fixed e®ects ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ Bank Bank
Results from logit estimation. The data include 38,993 bank-CBSA-year observations. The dependent
variable is log(sjmt) ¡ log(s0mt), where sjmt is the market share of bank j and s0mt is the outside
good market share. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level
and shown in parenthesis. Signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***,
respectively.
40Table 6: Mixed Logit Regression Results
Means St. Dev Income
Variable (¯'s) (¾) (¼)
Deposit interest rate
rD
















Results from mixed logit estimation. The data include 38,993 bank-
CBSA-year observations. The regression also includes an intercept.
The instruments are loan-side measures and competitor characteris-
tics. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and shown in
parenthesis. Signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by
*, **, and ***, respectively.
41Table 7: The Decision to Enter an Outside Market
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
The number of banks in the original market, by bank scope
NBK1ajt 0.032 -0.018*** 0.029 -0.021***
(0.041) (0.006) (0.039) (0.007)
NBK2ajt -0.232*** 0.001 -0.236*** -0.003
(0.074) (0.023) (0.075) 0.025)
NBK3ajt 0.034 0.027* 0.031 0.021
(0.069) (0.015) (0.068) (0.015)
NBK4ajt -0.069 0.061*** -0.072 0.027
(0.080) (0.022) (0.080) (0.022)
Market ¯xed e®ects yes no yes no
Bank controls yes yes no no
Pseudo R2 0.131 0.069 0.121 0.048
Results from logit regressions. The data include 14,469 bank-year observa-
tions from 3,658 single-market banks over the period 2001-2005. The depen-
dent variable equals one if the single-market bank enters a second market in
the subsequent year, and zero otherwise. The variables NBK1ajt; NBK2ajt,
NBK3ajt and NBK4ajt are the number of banks in the original market with
branches in exactly one, exactly two, three through ten, and more than ten
CBSAs, respectively. The bank controls include the single-market bank de-
posit and branch market shares within the original market. The regressions
also include year ¯xed e®ects. Standard errors are clustered at the market
level and shown in parenthesis. Statistical signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
42Table 8: The Choice of which Outside Market to Enter
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
2CBSAjb -0.442** -0.241 4.460*** 4.625***
(0.226) (0.218) (0.139) (0.132)
Synergy Control yes yes no no
Pro¯t Controls yes no yes no
Pseudo R2 0.463 0.450 0.151 0.126
Results from conditional logit regressions. The observations are com-
binations of the 351 single-market banks that enter an outside market
over the sample period and the 359 outside CBSAs. The dependent
variable equals one if the single-market bank entered the outside mar-
ket, and zero otherwise. The variable 2CBSAjb equals one if a two-
market bank already exists with branches in the home and outside
market, and zero otherwise. The synergy control is the proportion
of banks in the original market that also have branches in the out-
side market. The pro¯t controls include the number of outside market
banks with branches in exactly one, exactly two, three through ten,
and more than ten CBSAs, as well as second-order polynomials in the
outside market median income, population, and land area. Statistical
signi¯cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and
***, respectively.
43